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Abstract 
 
Voter registration, it is widely argued, raises the costs of voting, thereby decreasing 
turnout.  Studies of turnout across states find that states with later registration dates or 
election day registration have much higher turnout rates.  Eliminating registration barriers 
altogether is estimated to raise voter participation rates by 5 to 10 percentage points. This 
paper presents panel estimates of the effects of the introduction of registration that 
exploits changes in registration laws and turnout within counties.  New York imposed 
registration on all of its counties in 1965; Ohio imposed registration in all of its counties 
in 1977.   We estimate that the imposition of registration on counties that did not have 
registration in these states decreased participation over the long-term by 3 to 4 percentage 
points.  Though significant, this is lower than estimates of the effects of registration from 
cross-sectional studies.  
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I. Introduction 
 
An extensive scholarly literature identifies registration as a substantial barrier to 
voting.  The logic is simple enough.  Crudely put, people weigh the benefits of voting 
against the cost, and the higher the cost the lower the participation rate (see for example 
Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993).  For some people, registration represents one more hassle 
that they do not feel strongly enough about to address.  Others do not think to register 
until the final week of campaigning piques their interest in the election, long after 
registration deadlines have passed.  Still others report that, although registered, they 
could not vote because of errors in the registration system.1
Empirical research has sought to measure the magnitude of the effect of 
registration on the size of the electorate.  Nearly all research is based on cross-sectional 
differences between states.  One stream of research examines aggregate turnout rates for 
states with different registration requirements (e.g., Highton, 1997; Rhine, 1996; Knack, 
1995; Knack 2001).  A second approach uses survey data to estimate the factors that 
predict voting, including measures of the stringency of state registration laws and 
requirements.  The survey data is then used to simulate the effects of a uniform 
liberalization of voter registration requirements to determine what percentage of voters 
would have voted had registration laws been more permissive (e.g., Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone 1978, 1980; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Mitchell and Wlezien, 1995).  
Irrespective of the method, researchers have reached the general conclusion that an 
easing of registration requirements would result in an increase in turnout of somewhere 
between 5 to 10 percentage points. 
Recently, Michael Traugott (2004) has raised serious doubts about the effects of 
changes in registration and absentee voting practices on turnout.  Surveying recent 
experience with election reform in many states, he concludes that few reforms have had 
measurable effects on participation, despite academic findings and reasoning predicting 
                                                 
1 The Current Population Survey asks registered voters who did not vote why they did not vote.  
Approximately 8 percent state that there was a problem with their registration when they tried to vote or 
tried to obtain an absentee ballot (Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project, 2001). 
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significant changes.  Part of the problem may lie with the methodologies used to estimate 
the effects of election laws. 
Cross-state comparisons, used in both aggregate and survey research, may reflect 
spurious association between turnout and election law caused by an important omitted 
variable.  Specifically, states that have more liberal registration laws may have a different 
sort of electorate – that is, one more inclined to vote.  After all, that electorate or their 
representatives approved a more “civic minded” or participatory way to run elections.   
To the extent that the survey does not capture this difficult to measure concept, the 
registration law itself might.  Other omitted variables include the multitude of other 
important election laws not measured, such as those regulating absentee ballots.  Such 
state-level effects are nearly impossible to hold constant in cross state data analysis 
because there are only 50 states and a potentially large number of factors. 
We correct this problem by studying a panel of counties within states.  Several 
states did not introduce statewide voter registration requirements until relatively recently.  
Today, North Dakota does not require voters to register, nor do Wisconsin towns of less 
than 5,000 inhabitants.  Seven other states – Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Minnesota, 
Nebraska, New York, and Ohio – also did not require statewide personal registration until 
the late 1960s or 1970s.  We measure the effect of registration on turnout by studying 
how the introduction of registration changed turnout at the county-level in two states, 
Ohio and New York.  We selected these two states because it is clear which counties had 
registration before the state required the practice for all counties, and because the state 
election reports disaggregate returns to the county level.   
Three important features of these data deserve note.  
First, the change in law is much more dramatic than that considered in previous 
studies.  New York and Ohio imposed registration on counties that previously had no 
such requirement.  Even same day registration states still require registration.  We expect 
a much larger change in turnout associated with the introduction of registration than we 
do with marginal changes in registration dates.  Indeed, the states that only recently 
imposed registration statewide provide an interesting contrast with studies of the 
introduction of registration in the 19th Century.  States introduced registration in the 19th 
Century to either combat corruption or to limit minority and immigrant voting.  Converse 
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(1974) and Rusk (1974) argue that registration and other institutional changes 
significantly reduced the size of the American electorate, while Burnham (1974) 
attributed the reduction to large demographic shifts.  We will revisit this matter in the 
conclusion. 
 Second, the level of observation is the county, rather than the state.  State laws 
and other state factors are held constant (the states did not significantly change other 
election administration laws in these years).  Also, because we can analyze the immediate 
change in voting rates within counties, demographic and sociological factors are held 
constant.   
Third, the change in law was exogenous for the counties involved.  The states 
imposed registration on the counties; the counties did not choose to have their practices 
changed.  The New York and Ohio state legislatures amended their voter registration 
laws in 1965 and 1977, respectively, each imposing registration statewide.  In this 
respect, the change in law is exogenous.  The aim of the paper is to refine empirical 
estimations of the effect of registration on voter turnout, by taking advantage of the 
natural experiment provided by the changes in these states’ laws.   
To preview our results, we find that the imposition of registration had a noticeable 
effect on turnout, but much smaller than what is commonly estimated.  The imposition of 
registration in New York and Ohio accounts for about a 3 to 4 percentage point 
difference in voter turnout.  Additionally, we estimate that the introduction of voter 
registration to counties in New York and Ohio led to a short-term decline in voter turnout 
of up to 7 percentage points, but that effect vanished after one election. Thus, reformers’ 
disappointment about the modest impacts of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 
(NVRA) and other electoral reforms (Traugott, 2004), might reflect biases in previous 
statistical estimates of the effects of registration on turnout, rather than failures of the 
laws. 
The balance of this paper is organized as follows.   In section II, we describe the 
voter registration laws in New York and Ohio.  In section III, we explain our methods 
and present our estimates of the effects of registration on voter turnout.  Last, in section 
IV, we discuss the implications of our results. 
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II. Registration Laws in New York and Ohio 
 
 The 1960s and 1970s was a period of considerable voter registration reform.  The 
1970 Voting Rights Act Amendments and a subsequent Supreme Court decision resulted 
in an effective federal mandate of a maximum thirty-day residency requirement for 
participation in federal elections in the fifty states (Hansen, 2001).  Several states also 
made significant changes to their voter registration laws.  Five states – Maine, Minnesota, 
Ohio, Oregon, and Wisconsin – adopted election-day registration, although voters in 
Ohio (by constitutional amendment in 1977) and Oregon (by ballot initiative in 1985) 
repealed it soon after.  Often overlooked, however, is the fact that, for some parts of 
Minnesota and Wisconsin, the move to election-day registration meant shifting from no 
registration to registration.  In other words, even though election-day registration is a 
relatively minor barrier to voting, voters in some parts of these states were required to 
register for the first time.  In fact, as late as 1972, voter registration was not required in 
portions of Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin (Smolka, 1977; 
Council of State Governments, various years).  In two other states, New York and 
Nebraska, state laws did not include statewide personal registration provisions until 1965 
and 1967, respectively.   
 We exploit the variation in registration requirements within states to improve 
estimates of the effects of registration on turnout.  Prior research has recognized the 
variation in registration requirements within these states (e.g., Smolka, 1977; Rosenstone 
and Wolfinger, 1978; Knack, 2001), but few have explicitly studied them.2   Variation in 
registration laws within states allows us to hold constant state-level factors and to better 
control for demographics.  Unfortunately, we cannot study all seven states.  It is difficult 
to piece together the specific laws governing voter registration below the state level.  For 
most states, this information is simply not available.3  Some states allowed counties and 
                                                 
2 Burnham (1974) who utilized this within-state variation in Missouri, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania 
for a period around the turn of the 20th century.  Two unpublished studies – Martin, (1998) and Anderson 
(1983) have considered the Ohio case discussed in this paper, though they do not estimate the full panel 
model.     
3 We contacted state election officials, state research and law libraries, and other resources in the states in 
an effort to collect such information, but none of the states had compiled these data.  We also reviewed past 
state statutory code, state legislature session laws, state publications, and the existing voter registration 
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towns the option of requiring registration, and there is no official record of which areas 
actually used registration.  As a result, except in New York and Ohio, it does not appear 
possible to determine with any confidence which required and which did not require 
voters to register.4
In a couple of states, however, we are able to determine county-by-county voter 
registration information.  In New York, past editions of a now obsolete annual 
publication, The Manual for the Use of the Legislature of the State of New York, indicate 
the number of election districts in each county that required personal registration and the 
number that did not.  Similarly, for Ohio, the bi-annual publication Ohio Election 
Statistics, contains county-by-county (in fact, town-by-town) statistics on voter 
registration.  Here too, data are provided indicating the number of precincts in each 
county that required personal registration.  We recorded whether each county required, 
partially required (that is, required registration for only some towns in the county), or did 
not require personal registration in a given election year.5  We compiled these data for the 
years 1954 through the year that the state imposed mandatory registration – 1965 in New 
York (effective 1967) and 1977 in Ohio (effective 1978).6  As evidence of the extent of 
the within-state variation in registration laws, in the election year immediately prior to the 
law changes, 5 counties in New York and 22 counties in Ohio did not require registration, 
while an additional 37 and 4 counties, respectively, only required registration in parts of 
the county.  Counties with partial registration ranged from requiring as few as 2% of 
voters to register to up to about 80% of voters.   
Although our sample is unfortunately limited to New York and Ohio, studying the 
relationship between registration and turnout in these two states still provides us with 
                                                                                                                                                 
literature in attempt to assemble a list of which counties and cities did and did not have registration 
requirements prior to the state making them mandatory.  Complicating our efforts for most of these states 
were provisions in their statutory code which allowed counties and cities to adopt registration voluntarily, 
either by resolution of local election officials or by ballot initiative. 
4 Rosenstone and Wolfinger (1978) reached a similar conclusion regarding the difficulty of disentangling 
registration laws below the state level (see footnote, 28). 
5 For Ohio, we corrected discrepancies in the number of precincts requiring registration.  In several cases, 
the total number of precincts reported as requiring registration exceeded the total number of precincts in the 
county or under-counted – almost always by one or two precincts – the number of precincts requiring 
registration.  The latter was evident by the fact that in election years immediately prior or succeeding the 
year in question, the county required full registration. 
6 In the case of New York, there was an interim period from 1965 to 1966 in which counties had the option 
of putting in place mandatory registration, before the state law enacted in 1965 came into effect for the 
entire state in 1967. 
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distinct methodological advantages compared to most previous analyses.  Our panel data 
allows us to control for any unobserved, county-level effects that might bias estimations.  
The fact that registration requirements varied within these states at the county level 
allows us to hold constant state-level factors (e.g., candidates, economic conditions) that 
vary across states and are unaccounted for in cross-sectional studies.  Moreover, the 
changes in state election law put in place by the state legislatures are exogenous to 
county-level phenomena, thereby enabling us to generate unbiased estimates of the 
effects of registration on county-level turnout. 
We estimate voter turnout in the usual way by dividing the total number of votes 
in the highest office at stake in each election by the number of eligible voters.7  For our 
vote data, we use county-level election returns compiled by Clubb, et al. (1986) for the 
years 1954 to 1968.  From the period beginning with the 1970 election, we use data from 
the New York Red Book, election returns provided by the New York State Board of 
Elections, and Ohio Election Statistics.  To estimate county-level voting-age population, 
we use data collected by the U.S. Census Bureau and reported in various editions of its 
City and County Data Book.  While the Census Bureau regularly estimates voting-age 
population at the state level, it only does so at the county-level for decennial census 
years.  To estimate the number of eligible voters in each county in non-census years, we 
impute the voting-age population for non-census years using a commonly employed 
linear interpolation method.8
 
III. The Effects of Registration on Voter Turnout 
 
We provide three different estimates of the effects of the introduction of 
registration on turnout.  First, following much of the literature, we analyze the difference 
in turnout between counties that had registration and counties that did not.  This serves as 
a base case with which we establish the result one would get from cross-sectional 
                                                 
7 We use total votes for presidential election years.  For non-presidential years, we use total votes in 
senatorial election, if available, and total votes in gubernatorial elections otherwise. 
8 This approach, for instance, is used by Clubb, et al. (1986) in their compilation of county-level electoral 
data.  The 1970s editions of the County and City Data Book do not provide an estimate of the voting-age 
population in 1970, but instead do for 1972.  We use the 1972 data in our imputations. 
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analysis.  Second, we present a panel model with fixed-effects for each county.  Third, 
we present an analysis of “differences on differences”:  the short-term change in turnout 
among counties on which registration was imposed versus the short-term change in 
turnout among counties that already had registration.  Both of these statistical models 
hold the county constant.  Differences on differences reflects short-run changes in 
turnout, while fixed effects captures longer-term changes in counties’ turnout rates when 
the registration law changes. 
 
Cross-Sectional Analysis 
The cross-sectional analysis is presented in Table 1.  Here we estimate the effect 
of registration on voter turnout by contrasting turnout in counties with registration and 
counties without registration from 1954 through the election prior to the change in state 
law.9   
[Table 1 here] 
The difference between these two types of counties is considerable.  In 
presidential-year elections, New York counties with registration had rates of turnout that 
were, on average, 13 percentage points lower than the New York counties without 
registration.  In Ohio, the difference is approximately 10 percentage points.  A difference 
of means test indicates that the differences are statistically significant.  These estimates 
are on the high end of the range of estimates resulting from previous analyses.  A third 
type of county had partial registration – some towns have registration, but not all.  
Predictably, mean turnout in partial registration counties rests between that full and non-
registration counties.10   We find similar results for non-presidential-year elections.  Mean 
turnout in counties with registration was 10 and 5 percentage points lower than in non-
registration counties in New York and Ohio, respectively.  A difference of means tests 
indicates that these results are also statistically significant at conventional levels.   
                                                 
9 We begin our analysis with 1954 because both the New York and Ohio legislatures amended their 
election laws in this year, including sections pertaining to voter registration.   
10 These results hold when we use a less stringent standard for classifying counties as full registration.  For 
instance, when coding any county with at least 80% of its election districts or precincts requiring 
registration as full registration counties, there remains a difference of about 10 percentage points in the 
mean turnout differential counties between full registration and non-registration counties. 
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These differences are also apparent in Figures 1 and 2.  Noteworthy from these 
graphs is the fact that the observed differences in the mean turnouts are not simply a 
function of us having pooled elections for the purpose of analysis.  In each election, for 
both states, the mean turnout for non-registration counties exceeded that of full 
registration counties. 
[Figures 1 and 2 here] 
Controlling for demographic characteristics of these counties lowered the 
estimated effect of registration, but only slightly.  We performed two regression analyses 
for each state.  In one analysis we pool all presidential elections; in the other analysis we 
pool all mid-term elections (excluding partial registration counties).  We include dummy 
variables for years as well as county-level measures of percent of the population over 65 
years old, percent with high school education, median family income, and percent 
African-American.  The coefficient on registration (measured as the percent of the county 
registered) equals -.06 in Ohio presidential elections and -.01 in Ohio congressional 
elections; standard errors are .01 for each.  The first effect is statistically significant; the 
latter is not.  The coefficients on registration for New York are of about the same size, 
but are not statistically significant; the coefficient is -.05 and -.02 in New York 
presidential and congressional elections, respectively, with standard errors of .03 for 
each.  In sum, for presidential elections, counties with registration have turnout rates 5 to 
6 percent lower than counties without registration, controlling for income, education, 
race, and age.   
 
Panel Model Estimates 
The panel structure of the data allow us to examine how turnout changes when 
laws change.  Also, because the New York and Ohio imposed registration on counties 
that had not yet adopted it, we can use the panel to estimate how an exogenous change in 
the registration law affects turnout.  The structure of the panel data, moreover, allows us 
to control for time-invariant, county-level idiosyncrasies that might also help to explain 
variation in voter participation rates, but that we cannot measure using the census data.   
Specifically, we compute the change in turnout from one election prior to the law 
change to one election after the law change for counties that did not have registration 
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before it was imposed by the states.  As a contrast or control group, we measure the 
change in turnout in counties that had registration throughout for the same set of 
elections.  The estimated effect of the law change is the change in turnout in the counties 
that previously had no registration minus the change in turnout in counties that had 
registration.  As before, we make separate estimates for presidential and congressional 
election years.    
As is shown in Table 2, turnout did decline with the introduction of registration.  
In New York presidential elections, mean turnout in counties required to register their 
voters for the first time was 7 percentage points lower than in the previous presidential 
election year.  The decline in turnout in the counties with registration, though, was 5 
percentage points.  The net effect equals 2 percentage points and is statistically 
distinguishable from 0.  In non-presidential years, the effect is less than one percentage 
points and not significant.  In Ohio presidential elections, turnout declined 8 percent in 
counties without registration and grew 1 percent in counties with registration, for a net 
effect of 9 percentage points.  In non-presidential elections in Ohio, turnout declined 11 
percentage points among the counties on which registration was imposed.  Average 
turnout fell 4 percentage points among counties that already had registration, with a net 
effect of 7 percentage points.  
[Table 2 here] 
 We can introduce demographic controls and refine these estimates further by 
modeling the panel structure more explicitly.  Two different sorts of panel estimates are 
possible.  First, fixed effects regressions hold constant the unit of observation (i.e., a 
dummy variable for each county) by subtracting the unit-level average value of each 
variable.  In essence, this estimator measures the effect of changing registration laws on 
long-term average turnout.  Second, differences on differences regressions, a commonly 
employed approach for studying the effect of a major change in government policy 
(Angrist and Krueger, 1999), capture the immediate short-term effect of the policy 
innovation.   
Our first regression model is a fixed effects specification that enables us to make 
use of both over-time and cross-section variation.  The dependent variable is county-level 
turnout, and we consider elections from 1954 through 2000.  Thus, for the 149 counties in 
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our dataset (61 in New York and 88 in Ohio), we have 24 observations (i.e., turnout in 
the 24 elections from 1954 through 2000).11  The specification is as follows: 
Tit = α + ßXit + γ1Rit + γ2Lit + δYt + µi + εit          (1) 
where i indexes counties, t indexes years, T is turnout, X is a vector of demographic 
variables, R is the registration status of each county, L is a variable representing the effect 
of the state law change, Y is a vector of year dummies, µ is a variable representing any 
time-invariant, unobserved county-level effects, and ε is a stochastic error term.   
The independent variables of primary interest include the registration status of 
each county, R, by which we mean the percentage of election districts in each county 
requiring registration.  Additionally, we are particularly interested in L, our measure of 
the direct impact of the state’s adoption of statewide registration requirements.  The 
variable L captures the short-term effect of the law change.  For the impacted counties, 
the effect will vary since counties ranged from having no election districts with prior 
registration to those having over 80% already requiring registration.  This variable is 
created by multiplying a dummy variable indicating the first election in which the 
counties were required to register voters due to the change in state law (coded 1 for 
counties affected by the law change in first election after state law change, and 0 
otherwise) with the percentage of the county requiring registration before the law change.  
The coefficient on this term can be interpreted as the impact of registration specifically 
due to the law change, and, thus, it is distinct from the impact of registration itself.  
Theoretically, this measure captures the possibility that voters in counties required to 
register for the first time, may have faced complications in casting a ballot due to the 
newly-introduced requirement to register.  Our expectations are that γ1 < 0 and γ2 < 0, and 
their sum can be interpreted as the total immediate impact of the introduction of voter 
registration in New York and Ohio.12
                                                 
11 We exclude Hamilton County from the analysis because reported turnout is skewed by the fact that 
voting residence extended beyond the boundaries of residence defined by the U.S. Census Bureau, so data 
on voting-age population is too low (see p. 336 of the 1977 County and City Data Book).  We also drop 
observations for Putnam County for 1950-1960 due to the Census Bureau’s underestimation of the county’s 
voting-age population. 
12 We should note that we originally tried to isolate the effect of the registration close date by including a 
separate “days” variable for this effect in our model.  We did this in recognition of the consistent finding in 
the literature about the importance of the number of days before an election in which registration closes 
(e.g., Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980; Gilliam, 1985).   In both New York and Ohio, the registration close 
date varied during the period of our time series, and, in New York, the close date often varied across 
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Also included in our model are a set of county-level demographic variables to 
control for other possible influences on county-level turnout.13  We compile these data 
from various editions of the U.S. Census Bureau’s County and City Data Book.  These 
data are only available at the county-level for decennial-census years so we impute the 
data for non-census years using linear interpolation.14  The demographic variables 
included are median family income (we use the log value for numerical stability), the 
percentage of the population (25 years and older) having completed at least high school, 
and the percentage of the population that is African-American.15  We expect positive 
coefficients for each of these demographic variables (after undoing the log on the income 
variable) except for the percent of population that is African-American. 
We also include year dummy variables to account for ballot effects (i.e., whether 
the election includes a presidential, senate, and/or gubernatorial election; electoral 
competitiveness) and other possible election-year shocks, as well as a time variable to 
control for any trend effects (coded 1 for year one in the series, 2 for year two in the 
series, etc.).  Finally, we employ county-level fixed effects when estimating this equation, 
which enables us to remove any time-invariant, unobserved county-level factors that 
might too influence turnout.  These fixed effects will also capture other county-level 
demographic variables not included in the model.  Descriptive statistics for all of the 
variables included in the model are presented in the top portion of Table A in the 
Appendix.   
                                                                                                                                                 
counties until the early 1990s.12  However, inclusion of a registration close date variable introduced 
multicollinearity into our equation, inhibiting our ability to judge the statistical significance of the 
estimated coefficients.  Thus, when interpreting the coefficient on the registration variables, part of the 
effect likely captures that of the registration close date found in other studies. 
13 Typically in this type of analysis, it is necessary to include dummy variables for each state to take into 
account any unobserved state-specific variation.  In this case, however, since only two states are included in 
our dataset, these state-level effects are already captured by our specification.   
14 Linear interpolation might introduce measurement error for these variables, thereby biasing our estimated 
coefficients.  Measurement error, if present, would attenuate the effects of our coefficients (i.e., bias them 
toward zero) – that is, in this case, the actual negative coefficients on the registration variables would be 
larger.  We check for this possibility by estimating the same fixed effects model for only those election 
years for which we have data from the Census Bureau (1960, 1970, etc.).  The coefficient estimating the 
effect of registration on turnout is slightly smaller (about .02), but still statistically significant, providing 
some evidence that measurement error is not biasing the results in our previous analyses. 
15 Other possible demographic correlates of turnout are not available for our complete time-series.  The 
1994 edition of the County and City Data Book which contains data for 1990 does not include data for the 
median age of the population and the percent of the population living in urban areas. 
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 The results of our fixed effects regression model are presented in the first three 
columns of Table 3.  The first column of coefficients presents the results from estimating 
model (1) for the years 1954 through 2000.  The effect of registration on turnout is clear.  
The coefficient on the percent of county required to registration is -.037, which suggests 
about a 3.5 percentage point decline in turnout for counties moving from no registration 
to registration.  The effect for counties already requiring some voters to register, of 
course, would have been smaller.  The coefficient of about -.02 for the law change 
variable indicates an additional effect of registration on turnout for those counties 
impacted by the states’ adoption of statewide registration.  This means that, for those 
counties without registration prior to the law change, turnout suffered a cumulative 
decline of about 5 to 6 percentage points in the first election after the law came into 
effect.  But the long-term difference in turnout before the law change and after the law 
change was only 3.5 percentage points. 
 We tested the robustness of these results several ways:  (1) different time periods, 
(2) excluding partial registration, and (3) separate estimates for New York and Ohio.  
We estimate the same fixed effects model for a period of time (1960-1986) more 
closely around the years of the state law changes of interests.  Our model yields similar 
coefficients for this shorter time-series; these are presented in the second column of Table 
3.  The impact of registration on turnout is again about 3 to 4 percentage points, with an 
additional negative effect on turnout due to the state law change of about 2 to 3 
percentage points. 
 The results are also stable when we consider only “pure cases.”  The third column 
of estimates in Table 3 shows the estimates when we exclude counties with partial 
registration.  The decline in turnout for just those counties shifting from no registration to 
registration is approximately 3 to 4 percentage points.  The coefficient on the law change 
variable is again about 2 percentage points.   
 Finally, New York and Ohio differed somewhat, but the differences are not 
statistically significant.  We ran the analyses reflected in the first, second, and third 
columns of estimates for New York and Ohio separately.  The coefficient on L does not 
differ between the states.  The coefficient on R is around -.05 in Ohio, and -.03 in New 
York. 
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[Table 3 here] 
The differences on differences estimates build on the fixed effects specification. 
Taking first differences in equation (1) leads to the following equation:   
Tit – Tit-1 = α + ß(Xit – Xit-1) + γ(1 – Rit-1) + δYit + εi     (2) 
where i indexes counties, t indexes years, T is county-level turnout, X is a vector of  
county-level demographic variables, R is the percentage of election districts in the county 
requiring registration, Y is a year variable to capture election-specific shocks, and ε is a 
stochastic error term.  In the election following the imposition of registration all counties 
and towns required registration so Rt = 1 and the difference is 1 – Rt-1. 
 The variable of primary interest in our model is the registration status of each 
county, R, which we again operationalize as the percentage of each county requiring 
registration.  The model is constructed such that, in election year t, all counties are 
required to register their voters.  Thus, for counties requiring all their voters to register at 
t-1 (that is, before the state made it compulsory), the change in R will be zero.  For 
counties that previously did not require registration, the change in the registration 
variable is 1 – Rt-1, because once registration is required Rt = 1.  Our expectation is that γ 
< 0, because the introduction of registration is expected to lower turnout.   
We also include the same set of demographic control variables as in the fixed 
effects model, as well as the percent of county population that is urban and the median 
age of the county population, since these data are available for the years we consider.  We 
also include year dummies (at year t only) to control for ballot effects and other possible 
election-year shocks that influenced turnout.  Last, the first-differencing process removes 
any unobserved county-level effects that do not vary over time.  Descriptive statistics for 
these variables for each set of elections we analyze below are presented in the bottom 
portion of Table A in the Appendix.    
We first consider the differences on differences model using data from the 
elections immediately before and after the law change in each state – that is, 1966 and 
1970 for New York and 1976 and 1978 for Ohio.  It did not matter that we mixed 
presidential and congressional elections for these estimates, since they were similar for 
presidential election to presidential election and congressional election to congressional 
election.  We present the pooled analysis here for simplicity. 
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The results are presented in the last two columns of Table 3.  The coefficient on 
the registration variable is -.085, which suggests that the states’ imposition of registration 
requirements had a large effect on county-level turnout.  This estimate is driven entirely 
by the Ohio data, for which the coefficient equaled -.095 and was highly significant.  The 
estimate for New York was not statistically different from 0.  This might reflect 
idiosyncrasies in the specific elections at stake. 
More reliable estimates emerge when comparing two elections before the law and 
two elections after.  The final column of Table 3 presents the estimated effect of the 
registration law using a two-election window.  The coefficient on the registration variable 
is approximately -.04, which suggests that the impact of New York and Ohio introducing 
voter registration requirements on a statewide basis led to about a 4 percentage point drop 
in voter turnout for counties not previously having personal registration laws in effect.  
The estimated effects for New York and Ohio separately in this model are quite similar – 
approximately -.05 for Ohio and -.03 for New York.  So, the estimates appear stable. 
In sum, the estimates from the fixed effects and differences on differences models 
suggest a clear conclusion: personal registration requirements led to a decline in county-
level turnout in New York and Ohio.  Our panel estimates suggest an effect of about 3 to 
4 percentage points, with an additional one-time drop in turnout of about 2 to 3 
percentage points in the first election for those counties required for the first time to 
register all of their voters. 
 
IV. Conclusions 
 
Registration laws exist to ensure the integrity of the electoral process.  In most 
states, they were introduced in the 19th Century to combat widespread corruption, but 
they have also been used to exclude voters, as Key (1949) describes.  Today, reforms 
such as same day registration and later registration dates seek to lessen the obstacle to 
voting posed by registration.  The critical questions are how large is the effect of 
registration on participation, and how should we weigh that problem against the potential 
problem of vote fraud?   
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The relatively recent introduction of voter registration into all counties in Ohio 
and New York provides a powerful means through which to estimate the magnitude of 
the effect of registration itself on participation.  As with many other studies, we have 
found a highly statistically significant drop in turnout in counties on which registration 
was imposed compared with counties that had already chosen to use registration.  The 
effect we observe, however, is approximately half as large as the effect commonly 
estimated.    
The reason is methodological.  Cross-sectional studies find effects of registration 
on participation rates in the range of 5 to 10 percent.  In New York and Ohio, we find that 
as well.  During the 1950s and 1960s (and the early 1970s in Ohio), counties with 
registration had turnout rates roughly 10 percentage points lower than counties without 
registration.  Half of that effect, though, seems to be due to features of the counties other 
than the registration law.  When we use the panel of observations to estimate the effect, 
we find that the introduction of registration within counties dropped turnout immediately 
by 4 to 7 percentage points, and that over the longer term, the change in turnout 
attributable to the introduction of registration is approximately 3 to 4 percentage points.   
As an historical and political matter, it is noteworthy that we look at the 
introduction of registration in an era long after the fall of Tammany and other political 
machines widely alleged to have won elections by buying votes.  The presumption today 
is that registration systems have been in place for a long time and were introduced to 
crush the corrupt practices of the 19th century.  They may have done just that, but the 
effects of the introduction of registration in the late 20th century, after machine politics 
had largely disintegrated, is similar in magnitude to the effects of the introduction of 
registration in urban areas in the 19th century.  The effects in the 19th Century are in the 
range of a 7 percentage point drop in turnout.  Converse (1972 and 1974) and Rusk 
(1970, 1971, and 1974) suggest that the introduction of registration and other institutional 
changes which decreased corruption account for the decline of turnout at the beginning of 
the 20th century.  Our findings from late in the 20th Century suggest that a substantial 
portion of the decrease in turnout attributable to registration at the beginning of the 20th 
Century likely reflected an actual decrease in voting among legally qualified voters, and 
not just the elimination of corrupt ballots. 
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Our findings also temper the contemporary debate over registration reform.  Many 
observers have expressed disappointment with recent registration reforms, such as those 
in the National Voter Registration Act.  The hope was to produce turnout in the range of 
60 to 70 percent, rather than 50 percent.  Our analysis suggests that expectations should 
have been lower, perhaps in the range of 53 or 54 percent.  This does not reflect the 
failure of the laws, but bias in statistical estimates of the effects of registration on turnout.  
Registration does produce lower rates voting, though the effects are smaller than prior 
research has indicated. 
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Table 1. Cross-Sectional Results: Mean Turnout Across Counties  
in Period Before Statewide Registration 
 New Yorka Ohio 
Presidential Years 1956-1964 1956-1976 
Full registration (NY=40; OH=245) .67 (.02) .59 (.05) 
Partial registration (NY=125, OH=60) .74 (.04) .66 (.06) 
No registration (NY=16, OH=223) .80 (.05) .69 (.06) 
Difference of means t-test Effect = .13 
t =  5.58 
Effect = .10 
t =  15.74 
   
Non-Presidential Years 1954-1966 1954-1974 
Full registration (NY=56; OH=221) .54 (.03) .46 (.04) 
Partial registration (NY=166, OH=68) .58 (.02) .49 (.05) 
No registration (NY=20; OH=239) .64 (.04) .51 (.05) 
Difference of means t-test Effect = .10 
t =  5.45 
Effect = .05 
t =  9.05 
a Excludes Hamilton County and Putnam County for years 1954-1960 (see footnote 11). 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
Effect and t-statistic is for difference of means test between full registration and no 
registration counties. 
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Table 2. Panel Results: Comparison of Mean Turnout in Election Year Prior to Law 
Change to Election Before Law Change 
 New Yorka Ohio 
Presidential Years 1968 vs. 1964 1980 vs. 1976 
Effect of statewide registration   
counties impacted (NY=41; OH=26)b -.07 (.003) -.08 (.001) 
 counties not impacted (NY=20; OH=62) -.05 (.01) .01 (.003) 
Difference of means t-test Effect = -.02 
t =  -3.84 
Effect = -.09 
t =  14.8 
   
Non-Presidential Years   
Effect of statewide registration 1970 vs. 1966 1978 vs. 1974 
counties impacted (NY=41; OH=26)b -.03 (.003) -.11 (.01) 
 counties not impacted (NY=20; OH=62) -.03 (.004) -.04 (.003) 
Difference of means t-test Effect = -.001 
t =  -.023 
Effect = -.07 
t =  -11.0  
a Excludes Hamilton County (see footnote 11). 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
b Includes counties in which some parts already had registration requirements in place (36 
counties in New York and 4 counties in Ohio). 
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Table 3. Registration Effects on Turnout in New York and Ohio 
 
Dep. Var. = County-Level Turnout 
 Fixed Effects Differences on differences 
 
1954-
2000 
1960-
1986 
1954-2000 
(excluding 
partial 
registration 
counties) 
One Election 
Before and 
After Law 
Change 
Two 
Elections 
Before and 
After Law 
Change 
       
% of county with 
registration 
-.037** 
(.003) 
-.033** 
(.003) 
-.035** 
(.003) 
-.085** 
(.008) 
-.044** 
(.007) 
      
Law change -.022** 
(.005) 
-.027** 
(.005) 
-.018** 
(.005)   
      
Log median family 
income 
-.094** 
(.010) 
-.079** 
(.017) 
-.117** 
(.010) 
-.010  
(.019) 
.035* 
(.016) 
      
%  Population with 
h.s. education 
.048* 
(.021) 
-.047 
(.031) 
.053*  
(.021) 
.250  
(.311) 
.066  
(.126) 
      
%  Population 
African-American 
-.814** 
(.044) 
-.746** 
(.073) 
-.855** 
(.044) 
-2.08** 
(.542) 
.059 
(.291) 
      
% Urban    -.311  (.202) 
.056 
(.091) 
      
Median Age    .005  (.009) 
.006 
(.004) 
      
Year dummya    .264** (.023) 
.233** 
(.019) 
      
Constant 1.28** 
(.079) 
1.57** 
(.132) 
1.44** 
(.082) 
-.087 
(.148) 
-.408** 
(.126) 
      
R2  .89 .92 .88 .94 .96 
# Obs.b 3572 2085 3150 149 149 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* Statistically significant at the .05 level; ** Statistically significant at the .01 level. 
Fixed effects models included year dummy variables and a time trend variable. 
Independent variables in differences on differences model represent ∆. 
a 1978, 1970, and 1970 respectively, is the year dummy omitted. 
b Hamilton County is excluded in differences on differences model (see footnote 11). 
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Appendix:  Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
 
 
Table A. Descriptive Statistics of Variables Included in Regression Models  
Fixed Effects Model (n = 3572)     
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
County-level turnout .53 .11 .17 .92 
% of county with registration .78 .39 0 1 
Law change .02 .14 0 1 
Log median family income 9.6 .80 7.7 11.3 
%  Population with h.s. education .49 .11 .20 .87 
%  Population African-American .04 .05 0 .38 
     
Differences on differences Model (n = 149) 
One Election Before and After Law Change 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
∆ County-level turnout -.09 .13 -.36 .11 
∆ % of counties with registration .37 .43 0 1 
∆ Log median income 7.5 .19 6.9 7.9 
∆ %  Urban .-002 .01 -.05 .08 
∆ %  Population with h.s. education .005 .04 -.05 .08 
∆ %  Population African-American .002 .01 -.002 .05 
∆  Median Age -.20 .72 -1.9 .86 
Two Elections Before and Two Elections After Law Change 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Min. Max. 
∆ County-level turnout .01 .14 -.23 .20 
∆ % of counties with registration .39 .43 0 1 
∆ Log median income 8.3 .48 7.3 9.0 
∆ %  Urban -.01 .03 -.07 .12 
∆ %  Population with h.s. education -.02 .08 -.15 .11 
∆ %  Population African-American .003 .01 -.01 .08 
∆  Median Age -.03 1.4 -4.3 2.6 
Hamilton County is excluded in differences on differences model (see footnote 11). 
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